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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial District Court in a civil case 
wherein the court granted a motion to dismiss. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-3-102(3)0) (West 2008). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Because a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a conclusion of law, we review for 
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's decision."1 A motion to dismiss 
assumes as true all facts and allegations and can only be granted where there is no 
possible basis on which recovery may be obtained. "The purpose of a rule 12(b)(6) 
motion is to challenge the formal sufficiency of the claim for relief, not to establish the 
facts or resolve the merits of a case... We also note that a dismissal is justified only when 
the allegations of the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a 
claim."2 In cases of negligence, courts are particularly loathe to dismiss a matter even at 
the summary judgment stage. "Summary judgment is generally inappropriate to resolve 
negligence claims and should be employed only in the most clear-cut case."3 Here, St. 
Mark's only demonstrated that a single avenue of discovery might be limited by virtue of 
a statutory privilege. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting dismissal. 
Whipple v. American Forklrr. Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996) 
Id. 
Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, Tf 27, 171 P.3d 442 
1 
Issues Presented for Review 
Issue #1: Hospitals alone control access to surgical facilities, equipment and support 
staff. Hospitals must use reasonable care when selecting or retaining those physicians 
who receive the privilege of access to surgical facilities and cannot allow 'just anyone' to 
come into the surgical theatre without consequence for their choice. 
Issue #2: Statutes abrogate a cause of action only where the legislature states the 
intent to limit, modify or eliminate a common law claim. Utah's statutory privileges for 
peer and care review do not express any legislative intent to limit, modify or eliminate 
common law negligence claims and expressly preserve the ability of individual patients 
to bring suit. 
Relevant Statutes. Rules and Constitutional Provisions 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-25-1, 26-25-3, 58-13-4, 58-13-5, attached as Addendum A. 
Statement of the Case 
Dr. Halversen first saw Ms. Archuleta on July 26, 2005 and planned a laparotomy 
surgery on Tina Archuleta. (R. 9). On August 4, 2005 Dr. Halversen performed that 
surgical procedure using St. Mark's surgical room, equipment and staff. (R. 10). During 
the procedure, Dr. Halversen encountered difficulties including adhesions, perforations 
and bleeding. (Id.). Dr. Halversen then discharged Ms. Archuleta from St. Mark's only 
two days after this extensive surgery. (Id.). Less than two days after discharge, Ms. 
Archuleta began to experience severe pain and complications, leading to her admission 
into McKay Dee Hospital. (Id.) 
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McKay Dee, after examination and some radiological work, immediately 
transferred her back to Dr. Halversen and St. Mark's Hospital. (Id.). McKay Dee's 
diagnosis/assessment at the time of transfer was questionable for "peritonitis from the 
surgery." (Id). After several corrective attempts by Dr. Halversen at St. Mark's, Ms. 
Archuleta found herself transferred yet again, to Salt Lake Regional. (R. 11). There, 
physicians performed over six additional corrective surgeries during the next year. Ms. 
Archuleta brought suit against Dr. Halversen for his negligence. Ms. Archuleta also 
named St. Mark's as a defendant, alleging that St. Mark's failed to seek consult when 
appropriate, inadequately trained healthcare provider employees, negligently credentialed 
Defendant Halversen and generally fell below the standard of care with regard to Plaintiff 
Tina Archuleta.4 (14). 
Importantly, prior to the surgery performed at St. Mark' s, Defendant Halversen 
had been sued for malpractice on at least three prior occasions: 
• Jean B Clark vs. R Chad Halversen, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Case 
#970902537; 
• Shirley Anne Falck vs. R Chad Halversen, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Case 
#990907712;and, 
4
 Defendant Halversen had an arbitration agreement in place which the District 
Court found valid and enforceable, thereby requiring Plaintiff to proceed with arbitration 
against Defendant Halversen. Co-defendant Simper was dismissed by stipulation of the 
parties. 
3 
• Sara Jane Morgan vs. R. Chad Halversen & St Mark's Hospital, Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Case #000910450. 
Defendant Halversen's status as an apparent repeat offender raises serious 
questions as to his competency as a physician. St. Mark's role as a co-defendant shows 
that St. Mark's knew or should have known of Defendant Halversen's incompetence. 
After the lawsuit currently before this Court, it appears that Defendant Halversen has 
withdrawn from the practice of medicine. Additionally, Defendant Halversen may have 
been the subject of numerous other claims which settled prior to the filing of a lawsuit. 
However, the District Court dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for negligent credentialing 
prevented further discovery or development of St. Mark's failure to use reasonable care in 
selecting and retaining Defendant Halverson. 
Summary of the Argument 
Utah law requires that, with every action, the actor exercise reasonable care. 
Negligent 'credentialing' simply sets out the factual basis on which a hospital may fail to 
exercise reasonable care. A hospital must use that care, prudence and ordinary skill in 
'credentialing' a surgeon necessary to prevent foreseeable harm. Just as a trucking 
company cannot hand over the keys of a tractor-trailer semi to a driver who lacks the 
skill, training or competence necessary to operate the vehicle, neither can a hospital hand 
over the surgical theatre to an unskilled or incompetent surgeon. 
The overwhelming majority of courts recognize the need to hold hospitals 
accountable for selecting and retaining the surgeons directing the surgical theatre. Under 
4 
a theory more broadly referred to as 'corporate liability/ hospitals not only act as 
gatekeepers to the surgical room, but also stand in the best position to prevent harm to the 
public as a result of incompetent, unskilled or unqualified surgeons. Utah has recognized 
corporate liability for hospitals since 1907. By requiring hospitals exercise due care 
when selecting physicians, the deterrent effect of tort law appropriately targets those with 
the most control and ability to prevent harm. 
These long standing common law claims for corporate negligence and negligent 
credentialing remain unaffected by statutes unless a clearly expressed legislative intent 
modifies, restricts or eliminates the claim. The statutes relied upon by St. Mark's lack a 
clear expression to modify the common law. More importantly, the statutes preserve the 
ability of patients to bring claims. Utah's Peer Review statute recognizes and preserves 
the right of a patient to bring an action against a hospital for negligence. 
Finally, the statutes at issue may not be construed to limit or eliminate a common 
law claim without constitutional ramifications. Stretching the statutory language to 
eliminate common law claims against the hospital for negligently selecting unqualified or 
incompetent surgeons runs afoul of constitutional prohibitions. 
Defendant Halversen practiced medicine and performed surgical procedures only 
by way of access to St. Mark's surgical facilities. Just as one cannot turn the car keys 
over to an incompetent driver, so too must St. Mark's refrain from enabling an 
incompetent surgeon to endanger and harm the public. St. Mark's either knew or should 
have known that Defendant Halversen lacked the necessary skill, training, and/or 
5 
competency to perform surgical procedures. St. Mark's failed to exercise reasonable care 
in selecting or retaining Defendant Halversen as a physician with the privilege to access 
and manage the operating room. 
ARGUMENT 
I. HOSPITALS MUST USE REASONABLE CARE WHEN SELECTING 
THE INDIVIDUALS WHO COMMAND THEIR SURGICAL FACILITIES. 
A. Hospital Evolution and the Need for Accountability in 
Selecting Those Who Direct the Surgical Theatre. 
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, physicians shunned hospitals as something little 
more than 'boarding houses' through which infections periodically swept the wards.5 
However, with advances in technology and a newfound departure from a strict charitable 
model, physicians began to embrace hospitals for both the technology provided and the 
ability to charge for services rendered.6 As a result, hospitals experienced a boom and the 
need to self-regulate arose.7 After several evolutions, the primary governing body over 
hospital standardization and regulation became the Joint Commission On Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations.8 The dual purpose of such standardization and regulation was 
to prevent imposition on hospitals of'incompetent' physicians and "to protect the 
5
 Craig W. Dallon, Understanding Judicial Review Of Hospitals 'Physician 
Credentialing And Peer Review Decisions, 73 Temp. L. Rev. 597, 600 (Summer 2000) 
6
 M a t 600-601. 
7
 M a t 601-602. 
8
 Id at 602. 
6 
public."9 Virtually all hospitals now credential physicians under, at a minimum, 
standards set forth by the JCAHO. 
As hospitals evolved from purely charitable entities, there arose a symbiotic 
relationship between the hospital and the physician. Although the hospital did not exert 
direct control over the surgeon or bill for his services, the hospitals increasingly 
benefitted by charging for the services they provided to support the physician's patients 
while in the hospital. While strictly not an employer-employee relationship, both parties 
advanced financially.10 More importantly, staff membership and credentialing afford the 
physician advantages in being able to admit patients to the hospital and authorization to 
provide specific care services.11 
Today, for the great majority of physicians, the ability to pursue his or her 
profession requires access to hospital facilities.12 Access to hospital facilities, in turn, 
requires credentialing and staff membership.13 The credentialing review process works 
as a 'gatekeeper' "effectively control [ling] admission to [] membership and grant of 
clinical privileges."14 "Credentialing decisions determine who is granted or retains staff 
9
 Mat 603. 
10
 Id. at 606-607. 
11
 Id. at 607-608. 
12
 Mat 612. 
13
 Mat 613. 
14
 Mat 610. 
7 
membership and the level of practice privileges the staff member enjoys."15 Because 
hospitals stand as the gatekeeper, they also stand in the best position to prevent 
incompetent, unqualified or poorly skilled surgeons from harming the public. 
Hospitals enjoyed 'charitable immunity' early on in their evolution. However, by 
the 1940s, recognition of the hospital's necessary role in permitting physicians to perform 
surgical procedures eroded this limited immunity. "The evolution of hospitals toward 
multifaceted, integrated healthcare facilities has eroded the traditional immunities 
healthcare institutions once enjoyed, which were based on the view that they were mere 
venues where independent contractor physicians carried out their practice of medicine."16 
Courts began holding hospitals liable for their own negligent acts, including the 
credentialing of unqualified or incompetent physicians.17 In this respect, and under the 
theory of corporate negligence, Utah courts were ahead of the curve by recognizing 
corporate negligence for hospitals in 1907 even if those hospitals were charities.18 
15
 Id. at 599. 
16
 Tort Claim for Negligent Credentialing Physician, 98 A.L.R. 5th 533 
17
 Dallon, Understanding Judicial Review, 73 Temp. L. Rev. at 617, 620. 
18
 See, Gitzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy Cross Hospital Ass 'n, 32 Utah 46, 88 P. 691, 696 
(Utah 1907)(overruled on other grounds); and, Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial 
Hospital Ass'n, 78 R2d 645, 652 (Utah 1938); see, also, 'Sessions VSessions v. Thomas 
Dee Memorial Hospital Ass % 89 Utah 222, 51 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1935). Further 
discussion infra. 
8 
Holding hospitals liable in tort for failing to exercise care in selecting physicians 
advances both the deterrent and retributive goals of tort law.19 "Health care systems, 
hospitals and other large entities through which care is delivered are directly implicated 
in the majority of harmful medical errors."20 Accordingly, in the context of preventing 
harm from medical negligence "the most promising opportunities for injury prevention 
lie at the organizational level. Yet tort incentives currently run to individuals, not 
organizations."21 However, the majority of courts considering the matter now recognize 
hospitals will be held accountable for their decision in selecting and retaining individuals 
who use their surgical facilities. 
In Larson v. Wasemiller, one of the more recent cases addressing a hospital's 
responsibility in selecting and retaining physicians, the court posed the following 
question: "Is the tort of negligent credentialing inherent in, or the natural extension of, a 
well-established common law right?"22 The court surveyed the law and found: 
At least 27 states recognize the tort of negligent credentialing, and at least three 
additional states recognize the broader theory of corporate negligence, even 
19
 "[C]ourts are concerned not only with compensation of the victim, but with 
admonition of the wrongdoer. When the decisions of the courts become known, and 
defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is of course a strong incentive to 
prevent the occurrence of harm." W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser And Keeton On The 
Law Of Torts § 4 at 25 (5th ed. 1984). 
20
 Michelle Mello & David Studdert, Deconstructing Negligence: The Role Of 
Individual And System Factors In Causing Medical Injuries, 96 Geo. L.J. 599, 620 (2008) 
21
 Michelle Mello & David Studdert, Deconstructing Negligence: The Role Of 
Individual And System Factors In Causing Medical Injuries, 96 Geo. L.J. 599, 620 (2008) 
22
 Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 304 (Minn. 2007). 
9 
though they have not specifically identified negligent credenlialing. In fact, only 
two courts that have considered the claim of negligent credentialing have outright 
rejected it.23 
The court identified several basic and fundamental principles of existing tort law support 
the claim for 'negligent credentialing,' including a theory of'corporate negligence.'24 
Under a theory of corporate negligence, hospitals owe a broad based duty which 
encompasses the need to exercise care in appointment of those who may exercise surgical 
privileges. "[T]he concept of 'corporate negligence' is broader than the concept of 
'negligent credentialing' in that corporate negligence includes acts of direct hospital 
negligence, such as negligence in supervising patient care or in failing to enforce hospital 
guidelines regarding patient care."25 
In this case, St. Mark's selected and retained a physician with a significant history 
of malpractice, including at least one claim in which St. Mark's stood as a co-defendant 
with Defendant Halversen. St. Mark's knew or should have known that Defendant 
Halversen lacked the skill and competence to perform surgical procedures within their 
facilities. St. Mark's cannot escape liability for failing to use reasonable care when 
23
 Id. at 306-307 (citations omitted). 
24
 The claim actually appears to be recognized in one form or another in the 
following 33 jurisdictions: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at nn. 3, 4. and, Tort Claim 
for Negligent Credentialing of Physician, 98 A.L.R. 5th 533, § 3 [a] (West 2008). 
25
 Larson, 738 N.W.2d at 307. 
10 
handing over the keys to the surgical facilities. Holding otherwise allows St. Mark's to 
bring in whomever they please to use their facilities, regardless of their skill, competence 
or training. A hospital without accountability for failing to use care has no incentive to 
exercise their gatekeeping power to prevent public harm at the hands of unqualified 
individuals. 
B. Utah Law Already Recognizes a Duty to Use Care When Selecting 
and Entrusting Individuals. 
This Court first recognized corporate negligence for hospitals in 1907. In 
Gitzhoffen v. Sister of Holy Cross Hosp., the court acknowledged that even though a 
hospital may not be held liable for the negligence of the staff and nurses, the hospital may 
still be "guilty of negligence in the selection of the physician or servant."26 Again, in 
1938, this Court acknowledged that hospital "institutions may be held liable for failure to 
exercise proper care in the selection of officers and servants, and may be held liable for 
negligently employing incompetent officers and servants, when injury results 
therefrom."27 
26
 Gitzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy Cross Hospital Ass 'n, 32 Utah 46, 88 P. 691, 696 
(Utah 1907)(overruled on other grounds). 
27
 Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 78 P.2d 645, 652 (Utah 
1938); see, also, 'Sessions I, 'Sessions v. Thomas Dee Memorial Hospital Ass yn, 89 Utah 
222, 51 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1935)("courts of this country have generally held that 
hospitals organized for charitable purposes are not liable to their patients for injuries from 
the negligence of their employees, when reasonable care is used in the selection and 
retention of an employee."). 
11 
Both these descriptions by early Utah courts fit with the broader concept of 
corporate negligence.28 Corporate negligence "is broader than the concept of negligent 
credentialing in that corporate negligence includes acts of direct hospital negligence, such 
as negligence in supervising patient care or in failing to enforce hospital guidelines 
regarding patient care."29 Ultimately, holding hospitals liable for their actions in 
retaining incompetent physicians was "by no means a radical move. Charitable immunity 
was, after all, an exception to the general rule that entities are liable for their own 
actions."30 
Today, Utah jurisprudence continues the tradition of holding the actor accountable. 
For purposes of negligence, a "duty of reasonable care is required of all; it is essential to 
the physical security and safety of all persons in a civilized society."31 Whenever an 
individual takes an action the individual owes a coextensive duty to act with reasonable 
care. "[T]he distinction between acts and omissions is central to assessing whether a duty 
is owed a plaintiff. In almost every instance, an act carries with it a potential duty and 
resulting legal accountability for that act."32 Here, St. Mark's acted by providing the 
28
 Neither Gitzhoffen nor the Sessions decisions formally adopted corporate 
negligence because they decided the issue on other grounds. However, the decisions 
nonetheless recognized the theory as viable and capable of eliminating the charitable 
immunity defense. 
29
 40A Am. Jur. 2d Hospitals and Asylums § 26 (West 2008). 
30
 Dallon, Understanding Judicial Review, 73 Temp. L. Rev. at 617. 
31
 Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 672 (Utah 1984) 
32
 Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, *{ 10, 125 P.3d 906, 909 (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 302 (1965). 
12 
means, methods, instruments and staff without which Defendant Halversen could not 
have committed malpractice. St. Mark's can no more allow incompetent surgeons access 
to the facilities and staff necessary to perform surgery than a trucking company can 
provide the tractor-trailer for an incompetent or intoxicated trucker to drive our freeways. 
St. Mark's either knew or failed to check on the competency of a surgeon prior to 
allowing him to operate using St. Mark's equipment, staff, labs and operating room. St. 
Mark's cannot simply be said to owe no obligation whatsoever in choosing and retaining 
the individuals who they permit to use their facilities. A holding that St. Mark's may 
freely disregard the competency of those they allow to use their surgical facilities subjects 
an innocent public to extreme risk of injury or death. St. Mark's must, as the entity 
providing the forum, equipment and means by which the public may be killed or injured, 
ensure that those granted the privilege to use those tools hold the requisite skill. 
A cause of action based in negligence because the tortfeasor enabled another to 
commit the tort is nothing new. Utah courts have long recognized claims for negligence 
arising from hiring, retaining, and supervising employees.33 Further, it is well-established 
that a hospital owes an independent duty of care to its patients under Utah law.34 The 
33
 See, e.g., Retherford v. AT&TComm., 844 P.2d 949. 967, 972-74 (Utah 1992) 
(negligent employment); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1048 (Utah 1991) 
(negligent supervision); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053, 1059 (Utah 1989) 
(negligent supervision); and, Stolle v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15 Utah 2d 49, 386 P.2d 910, 
911-12 (1963) (negligent hiring). 
34
 See, e.g., Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270,275-76 (Utah 1992); 
Dalleyv. Utah Valley Reg 1 Med. Ctr, 791 R2d 193, 200 (Utah 1990); Chapman exrel. 
Chapmanv. Primary Children's Hosp.. 784 R2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1989); and, Georgev. 
LDSHosp., 797 P.2d 1117, 1120-21 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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factual and legal basis for negligent credentialing and supervision over surgical staff 
differs in no meaningful way from a claim for negligent entrustment of an automobile or 
truck. 
Utah law recognizes claims for negligent entrustment as instances where the 
owner 'entrusts' "the vehicle to a driver that he knows or in the exercise of reasonable 
care should have known to be an incompetent, careless, reckless, or inexperienced driver 
or an intoxicated driver."35 Utah first recognized liability for negligent entrustment in 
1928. "[I]f the owner of an automobile... intrusts it to another... who because of 
inexperience... is not capable of safely driving or operating the car, the owner is required 
to anticipate, or ought to anticipate, that so intrusting the car... that injury to others may 
likely result."36 Here, St. Mark's negligently entrusted operating facilities to a surgeon 
they either knew or should have known lacked the competence, skill and care necessary 
to perform surgery. After all, St. Mark's themselves previously stood as a co-defendant to 
suit in which Defendant Halversen was accused of malpractice. 
It is universally accepted that one must exercise reasonable care when entrusting 
another to use equipment or perform an activity. "The Restatement Second, Torts takes 
the position that it is negligent to permit a third person to... engage in an activity which is 
under the control of the actor, if the actor knows or should know that such person... is 
35
 Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488, 491 (Utah 1986) 
36
 Wilcox v. Wunderlich, 73 Utah 1, 272 P. 207, 213 (Utah 1928). Ironically, Utah 
courts acknowledged corporate negligence for hospitals prior to negligent entrustment. 
See, Gitzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy Cross Hospital Ass % 32 Utah 46, 88 P. 691, 696 (Utah 
1907)(overruled on other grounds). 
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likely to conduct himself... in the activity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable 
risk of harm to others."37 The ability to control a thing or activity forms the basis on 
which liability will attach. "[T]he doctrine of negligent entrustment requires that the 
defendant have a greater right of possession or control... than the person to whom he or 
she entrusts it."38 St. Mark's controls access to the operating room, St. Mark's alone has 
the power to permit or prohibit entry into the surgery room. Accordingly, St. Mark's 
must exercise reasonable care when handing out the privilege of entry into surgical 
facilities. 
Finally, negligent credentialing is simply short-hand for facts and circumstances 
which require imposition of a duty previously adopted by this Court39 under Restatetment 
(Second) of Torts § 323. 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to 
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's 
person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting 
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm, or 
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.40 
37
 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 315, Negligent Entrustment Generally 
38
 Mat §321. 
39
 See, Nelson ex rel Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 573 (Utah 1996); 
DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah 1983). See, also, Atkinson v. 
Stateline Hotel Casino & Resort, 2001 UT App 63, If 18, 21 R3d 667; George v LDS 
Hospital, 797 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
40
 Restatement (Second) Torts, § 323. 
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St. Mark's rendered the service of providing a hospital surgical facility and the 
service of reviewing the credentials of surgeons allowed to practice in that facility. By 
granting surgical privileges and the facilities in which surgery could be accomplished, St. 
Mark's increased the risk of harm to patients. Additionally, it goes v/ithout saying that no 
patient would agree to have complex laparotomy surgery performed outside of a hospital 
setting. Accordingly, patients come to rely on the fact that surgeons have access to 
hospitals as demonstrating the surgeon's skill and competence. Hospital credentialing 
and privileging reassure patients and the public that they may trust the physician. After 
all, no one would agree to be scheduled for surgery in the physician's garage at 8:00 a.m., 
Monday morning, at least no one that could then be heard to complain when harm arises 
from an unskilled hand. 
II. A PLAIN TEXT READING OF UTAH'S CARE & CREDENTIALING 
STATUTES SHOWS THEY CANNOT BE CONSTRUED TO LIMIT A 
CAUSE OF ACTION BASED IN NEGLIGENCE. 
A review of the language of Utah's Care and Peer Statutes shows that (1) the plain 
text does not limit or erode common-law negligence claims; and, (2) any reading which 
erodes a negligence claim also runs afoul of constitutional limitations on statutory 
construction. 
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A, Statutes Must Occupy An Entire Legal Field In Order to Preempt 
Common Law Claims. 
Statutes will not be read to eliminate or modify a common law based claim unless 
there exists a clear legislative expression to do so.41 Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-13-4, 5 (the 
"Peer Review") and §§ 26-25-1, 3 (the "Care Review") make no mention of negligence 
or negligent credentialing. Accordingly, there exists absolutely no express basis on which 
to limit, modify or eliminate a negligence claim based on the failure to use due care in 
credentialing physicians. 
Whether a particular statute preempts a common-law claim is essentially a 
question of legislative intent. The intent may be either express or implied.42 As noted, 
neither the Care nor the Peer Review statutes mention 'negligence' as a cause of action to 
be limited by the statutes. Accordingly, in order to find statutory elimination of a claim 
for negligence/negligent credentialing, there must exist a statutory "structure and 
purpose ... so pervasive as to" eliminate common law or " be in irreconcilable conflict 
with the common law."43 
However, the Peer and Care Review, under closer inspection, offer nothing more 
than a limited or qualified immunity from suit brought by physicians/health care 
41
 Home v. Home, 131 R2d 244, 248 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 765 P.2d 1277 
(Utah 1987). 
42
 See, Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, \ 11, 997 P.2d 305. 
43
 Id. at J^ 11 (citation and quotation omitted). 
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providers subjected to review, i.e. an immunity more akin to judicial immunity than an 
absolute immunity from suit. 
A review of the history and background preceding enactment of the Care and Peer 
Review privileges demonstrates the need to protect participants from retribution by the 
provider under scrutiny. In the 1970s and 1980s, there were increasing concerns about 
the quality of health care.44 To avoid greater government regulation, the healthcare 
industry undertook to strengthen its efforts at self-regulation. Health care providers, 
however, were reluctant to participate in disciplinary actions against other physicians, in 
part because of a natural reluctance to sit in judgment on fellow professionals and in part 
because of perceived liability concerns. Physicians who were disciplined or who lost 
hospital privileges would file lawsuits, accusing their peers and the hospitals on whose 
boards they served of using the peer review process to eliminate competition in violation 
of the antitrust laws,45 of violating their civil rights,46 and other claims.47 To increase 
44
 Similar concerns resulted in the federal enactment 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-52 and 
creation of the National Practitioner Data Bank. 
45
 E.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1988); Decker v. IHCHosps., Inc., 
982 F.2d 433, 434 (10th Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 509 U.S. 924 (1993); Marrese v. 
Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1984), cert denied, All U.S. 1027 (1985); 
Posnerv. Lankenau Hosp., 645 R Supp. 1102, 1105 (E.D. Pa. 1986). 
46
 E.g., Decker, 982 F.2d at 434; Quinn v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1226, 
1230 (D. Del. 1985). 
47
 Teresa L. Salamon, When Revoking Privilege Leads To Invoking Privilege: 
Whether There Is A Need To Recognize A Clearly Defined Medical Peer Review Privilege 
Invirmani v. Novant Health Inc., Al Vill. L. Rev. 643, 651 -652 (2002). 
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participation in the peer-review process, the medical profession sought immunity from 
such claims. 
Both the Care Review and Peer Review statutes provide immunities and privileges 
which attach only to information provided' and 'participation in' conducting reviews, not 
a broad immunity or privilege from suit encompassing the whole field of negligence law. 
Under the Care Review, the statute provides that no liability may attach for providing 
information to a review committee.48 Further, the statute makes the information 
furnished and any findings or conclusions resulting from the studies privileged and not 
subject to discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in any legal proceeding.49 In sum, the 
Care Privilege represents nothing more than limited immunity for providing information 
and a discovery limitation. Given this limited scope, the Care Review provisions cannot 
be construed as an intent to limit negligence claims brought by a patient against a 
hospital. 
Similarly, there is no liability for providing information under the Peer Review 
statute. The statute provides that "[a]ny person or organization furnishing information ... 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-1 (West 2008). 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-3 (West 2008). 
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is immune from liability with respect to information provided."50 The statute further 
provides that no liability may arise as a result of "participation in a review."51 
In light of the history and background, the need to protect private health 
information coupled with a need to encourage free exchange of information and review 
led to a limited privilege and immunity. The Judiciary, this Court, employs a similar 
similar practice as part of the panel review of bar complaints prior to formal referral. 
Members on Utah's Ethics and Discipline Committee are entitled to a limited immunity 
from suit, "the same protections for statements made in the course of the proceedings as 
participants injudicial proceedings."52 Similarly, there is a limited confidentiality which 
attaches to the proceedings.53 However, under no circumstances could it be seriously 
argued that such immunities extend out to prohibit suit by a client harmed through an 
attorney's malpractice, or suit against that attorney's law firm for retaining and failing to 
supervise unqualified counsel. 
Other courts addressing Peer and Care Review statutes also reach the conclusion 
that these statutes do not eliminate the ability to bring a claim for negligent credentialing. 
In McCall v. Henry Medical Center, Inc., the court reviewed similar statutes and 
50
 Utah Code Ann. § 58-13-5(6)(a) (West 2008); see, also, § 58-13-4(2) providing 
that health care providers participating in reviews "are immune from liability with respect 
to deliberations, decisions, or determinations made or information furnished." 
51
 Id. at (6)(b). 
52
 Utah Lawyer Discipline and Disability Rule 14-513 
53
 Utah Lawyer Discipline and Disability Rule 14-515 
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concluded that the legislature did not directly or indirectly eliminate a cause of action 
brought by a patient.54 "The ultimate purpose of the peer review law is to improve the 
delivery of medical care to the patient. It was never intended that the peer review process 
be used in such a way as to effectively bar a plaintiff's tort action."55 
Our own Utah Court of Appeals also concluded that the privileges were "never 
intended to shield hospitals from potential liability or to provide hospitals protection from 
medical malpractice claims."56 The court in Cannon went on to warn against extending 
any privilege too broadly, urging that interpretation of the privilege against discovery be 
narrowly construed because the Plaintiffs "also have an important interest in the 
discovery of evidence, or information that will lead to evidence, that will support their 
claims."57 
In fact, the Peer Review statute preserves the ability to bring a common law 
action while providing no clear expression that negligence claims should be limited or 
eliminated. "This section does not relieve any health care provider from liability incurred 
in providing professional care and treatment to any patient."58 In this regard, the 
54
 551 S.E. 2d 739, 743 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). See, also, Browning v. Burt, 613 N.E. 
2d 993, 1007 (Ohio 1993) (peer-review immunity "does not provide blanket immunity to 
a hospital for negligence in granting and/or continuing staff privileges of an incompetent 
physician"), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 1111 (1994). 
55
 Id. 
56
 Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Med. Ctr., 2005 UT App 352, ^ 23, 121 P.3d 74. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-13-4(3) (West 2008). 
21 
legislature codified and preserved the ability of patients to bring claims based on the 
failure to use due care in selecting or retaining qualified, competent surgeons and 
physicians. Based upon this legislative recognition that patients retain their right to bring 
suit, any reading of the privileges and immunities must be done in a manner which folly 
permits not only the bringing of the claim, but also limits extension of the privilege to 
prohibit discovery when the action involves a third-party, i.e. someone other than a fallen 
health care provider seeking retribution through a civil lawsuit. 
The original purpose underlying the forebears of our modern statute is to protect 
the health, safety, and welfare of the public from unqualified and incompetent persons 
holding themselves out as professionals.59 The Care and Peer Reviev/ statutes, in light of 
their intended purpose to improve patient healthcare and protect those conducting 
reviews, should not be turned into a sword used to cut down a patient's claims. Nothing 
in the statutes operates to limit or eliminate a cause of action and, in fact, the statutes 
expressly preserve the ability of patients to bring claims. Narrowly limiting the 
application of immunities and privileges acknowledges the express right of patients 
which the legislature sought to preserve. 
B. Construing the Statutes to Eliminate a Cause of Action Creates a 
Constitutional Conflict. 
Statutes must be construed in a manner which avoids constitutional conflict. 
Courts are "constrained to construe statutory terms to avoid an unconstitutional 
59
 Clayton v. Bennett, 5 Utah 2d 152, 298 P.2d 531, 533 (1956); Smith v. American 
Packing & Provision Co., 102 Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951, 957 (1942). 
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application of the statute."60 Here, a construction eliminating the right to bring an action 
for negligence in selecting and credentialing physicians violates both the Equal 
Protection and Open Courts provisions of the Utah Constitution. In order to avoid such a 
constitutional conflict this Court should not accept such an overly broad statutory 
construction. 
Under our open courts provision "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for 
an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due 
course of law ... and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any 
tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel any civil cause to which he is a party."61 A 
two-part analysis determines whether a statutory construction impermissibly abrogates a 
remedy: 
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured person an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of law" for vindication of his 
constitutional interest. The benefit provided by the substitute must be substantially 
equal in value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing essentially 
comparable substantive protection to one's person, property, or reputation, 
although the form of the substitute remedy may be different. Second, if there is no 
substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of 
action may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be 
eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective.62 
60
 Utah State Road Comm 'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 831 (Utah 1984). 
61
 Utah Const. Art. I, § 11 
62
 Berry ex rel Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 1X1 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985)(citations 
omitted). 
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Turning to the first prong of the Berry test, it is clear that if the statutes prohibit the 
claim in this case, there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided to a plaintiff 
injured as a result of a hospital's negligent provision of credentials. As discussed above, 
the statute does not even mention credentialing activities, much less prescribe a new 
remedy for negligent credentialing. 
Satisfaction of the second prong of the Berry test requires demonstrating that the 
abrogation of the cause of action is not an "arbitrary or unreasonable means" of achieving 
the legislative objective. Even assuming that §§ 58-13-4 and 58-13-5 were meant to 
improve the quality of the medical care provided in hospitals, a valid legislative 
objective, granting immunity to hospitals for negligence in providing credentials to 
incompetent physicians clearly is an unreasonable means of achieving improved medical 
care because it does not further this legislative purpose. Indeed, immunizing hospitals for 
the negligent credentialing of physicians only increases the likelihood that patients will 
receive sub-standard medical care. Accordingly, because the abrogation of the negligent 
credentialing cause of action is an arbitrary and unreasonable means of achieving the 
legislative objective of improving the quality of health care provided in hospitals, this 
Court should deny St. Mark's motion to dismiss. 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[a]ll laws of a general 
nature shall have uniform operations." Whether a law operates uniformly under Article I, 
Section 24 turns not upon the facial validity of the statute, but upon the application of the 
statute to individuals. "A law does not operate uniformly if 'persons similarly situated' 
24 
are not 'treated similarly' or if'persons in different circumstances' are 'treated as if their 
circumstances were the same.'"63 Here, interpreting the statutes to prohibit claims by 
patients for negligently selecting and credentialing surgeons results in an interpretation 
which treats persons similarly situated differently. Specifically, by construing the statutes 
to eliminate negligence claims premised on credentialing while allowing other claims 
based on different bases for negligence, the construction offends the uniform operation of 
laws guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. Finally, such a construction would be an 
unreasonable and arbitrary imposition of differing treatment in light of the express 
legislative intent, discussed supra, to further assist patients in avoiding harm at the hands 
of incompetent surgeons. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah law first recognized corporate negligence in the selection and retention of 
staff as a viable claim in 1907. Since that time, Utah courts formally adopted the sub-
theories of negligent entrustment, negligent supervision, negligent hiring and negligent 
employment. Negligent credentialing simply represents that particular set of facts and 
circumstances under which a hospital may be held liable for failing to exercise due care 
in selecting and retaining competent surgeons. 
The Peer and Care Review statutes do not expressly limit a claim for negligence or 
negligent credentialing. In fact, the Peer Review statute expressly preserves the broad 
claim of'medical malpractice' and the right to bring such claim. Further, the statutory 
63
 Lee v. Gaufin, 867 R2d 572, 577 (Utah 1993). 
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immunities and privileges themselves do not operate to eliminate, modify or restrict 
negligence claims. Those statutes serve only to protect those participating in panel 
reviews from retributive lawsuits brought by health care providers who receive 
unfavorable reviews or are denied credentials. A blanket immunity precluding any action 
by an injured patient runs counter to the legislative purpose of the statutes, to protect 
patients and improve healthcare. Finally, any construction which operates to eliminate a 
patient's right to court access because a hospital failed to exercise reasonable care in 
selecting and retaining qualified individuals runs afoul of constitutional limits. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that she be given her day in court to 
hold St. Mark's accountable for handing over the surgical room to a repeat offender, 
Defendant Halversen, when St. Mark's either knew or should have known that he lacked 
the skills, qualifications and competence necessary to safely use their surgical facilities. 
DATED this: Octob^rJ6. 2008 
Peter W. Summerill 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-1. Authority to provide data on treatment and condition of 
persons to designated agencies — Immunity from liability. 
(1) Any person, health facility, or other organization may, without incurring 
liability, provide the following information to the persons and entities described in 
Subsection (2): 
(a) information as determined by the state registrar of vital records 
appointed under Title 26, Chapter 2, Utah Vital Statistics Act; 
(b) interviews; 
(c) reports; 
(d) statements; 
(e) memoranda; 
(f) familial information; and 
(g) other data relating to the condition and treatment of any person. 
(2) The information described in Subsection (1) may be provided to: 
(a) the department and local health departments; 
(b) the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health within the 
Department of Human Services; 
(c) scientific and health care research organizations affiliated with 
institutions of higher education; 
(d) the Utah Medical Association or any of its allied medical societies; 
(e) peer review committees; 
(f) professional review organizations; 
(g) professional societies and associations; and 
(h) any health facility's in-house staff committee for the uses described in 
Subsection (3). 
(3) The information described in Subsection (1) may be provided for the following 
purposes: 
(a) study and advancing medical research, with the purpose of reducing the 
incidence of disease, morbidity, or mortality; or 
(b) the evaluation and improvement of hospital and health care rendered by 
hospitals, health facilities, or health care providers. 
(4) Any person may, without incurring liability, provide information, interviews, 
reports, statements, memoranda, or other information relating to the ethical conduct of 
any health care provider to peer review committees, professional societies and 
associations, or any in-hospital staff committee to be used for purposes of 
intraprofessional society or association discipline. 
(5) No liability may arise against any person or organization as a result of: 
(a) providing information or material authorized in this section; 
(b) releasing or publishing findings and conclusions of groups referred to in 
this section to advance health research and health education; or 
(c) releasing or publishing a summary of these studies in accordance with 
this chapter. 
(6) As used in this chapter: 
(a) ""health care provider" has the meaning set forth in Section 78-14-3; 
and 
(b) "health care facility" has the meaning set forth in Section 26-21-2. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-3. Information considered privileged communications. 
All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other data 
furnished by reason of this chapter, and any findings or conclusions resulting from those 
studies are privileged communications and are not subject to discovery, use, or receipt in 
evidence in any legal proceeding of any kind or character. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-13-4. Liability immunity for health care providers on 
committees — Evaluating and approving medical care. 
(1) As used in this section, "health care provider" has the same meaning as in 
Section 78-14-3. 
(2) Health care providers serving in the following capacities and the organizations 
or entities sponsoring these activities are immune from liability with respect to 
deliberations, decisions, or determinations made or information furnished in good faith 
and without malice: 
(a) serving on committees: 
(i) established to determine if hospitals and long-term care facilities 
are being used properly; 
(ii) established to evaluate and improve the quality of health care or 
determine whether provided health care was necessary, appropriate, 
properly performed, or provided at a reasonable cost; 
(iii) functioning under Pub. L. No. 89-97 or as professional standards 
review organizations under Pub. L. No. 92-603; 
(iv) that are ethical standards review committees; or 
(v) that are similar to committees listed in this Subsection (2) and 
that are established by any hospital, professional association, the Utah 
Medical Association, or one of its component medical societies to evaluate 
or review the diagnosis or treatment of, or the performance of health or 
hospital services to, patients within this state; 
(b) members of licensing boards established under Title 58, Occupations 
and Professions, to license and regulate health care providers; and 
(c) health care providers or other persons furnishing information to those 
committees, as required by law, voluntarily, or upon official request. 
(3) This section does not relieve any health care provider from liability incurred in 
providing professional care and treatment to any patient. 
(4) Health care providers serving on committees or providing information 
described in this section are presumed to have acted in good faith and without malice, 
absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-13-5. Information relating to adequacy and quality of medical 
care — Immunity from liability. 
(1) As used in this section, "health care provider" has the same meaning as defined 
in Section 78-14-3. 
(2) (a) The division, and the boards within the division that act regarding the 
health care providers defined in this section, shall adopt rules to establish procedures to 
obtain information concerning the quality and adequacy of health care rendered to 
patients by those health care providers. 
(b) It is the duty of an individual licensed under Title 58, Occupations and 
Professions, as a health care provider to furnish information known to him with 
respect to health care rendered to patients by any health care provider licensed 
under Title 58, Occupations and Professions, as the division or a board may 
request during the course of the performance of its duties. 
(3) A health care facility as defined in Section 26-21-2 which employs, grants 
privileges to, or otherwise permits a licensed health care provider to engage in licensed 
practice within the health care facility, and any professional society of licensed health 
care providers, shall report any of the following events in writing to the division within 
sixty days after the event occurs regarding the licensed health care provider: 
(a) terminating employment of an employee for cause related to the 
employee's practice as a licensed health care provider; 
(b) terminating or restricting privileges for cause to engage in any act or 
practice related to practice as a licensed health care provider; 
(c) terminating, suspending, or restricting membership or privileges 
associated with membership in a professional association for acts of 
unprofessional, unlawful, incompetent, or negligent conduct related to practice as 
a licensed health care provider; 
(d) subjecting a licensed health care provider to disciplinary action for a 
period of more than 30 days; 
(e) a finding that a licensed health care provider has violated professional 
standards or ethics; 
(f) a finding of incompetence in practice as a licensed health care provider; 
(g) a finding of acts of moral turpitude by a licensed health care provider; 
or 
(h) a finding that a licensed health care provider is engaged in abuse of 
alcohol or drugs. 
(4) This section does not prohibit any action by a health care facility, or 
professional society comprised primarily of licensed health care providers to suspend, 
restrict, or revoke the employment, privileges, or membership of a health care provider. 
(5) The data and information obtained in accordance with this section is classified 
as a "protected" record under Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and 
Management Act. 
(6) (a) Any person or organization furnishing information in accordance with 
this section in response to the request of the division or a board, or voluntarily, is immune 
from liability with respect to information provided in good faith and without malice, 
which good faith and lack of malice is presumed to exist absent clear and convincing 
evidence to the contrary. 
(b) The members of the board are immune from liability for any decisions 
made or actions taken in response to information acquired by the board if those 
decisions or actions are made in good faith and without malice, which good faith 
and lack of malice is presumed to exist absent clear and convincing evidence to 
the contrary. 
(7) An individual who is a member of a hospital administration, board, committee, 
department, medical staff, or professional organization of health care providers is, and 
any hospital, other health care entity, or professional organization conducting or 
sponsoring the review, immune from liability arising from participation in a review of a 
health care provider's professional ethics, medical competence, moral turpitude, or 
substance abuse. 
(8) This section does not exempt a person licensed under Title 58, Occupations 
and Professions, from complying with any reporting requirements established under state 
or federal law. 
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RECEIVED JUN 2 5 2006 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ^ 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
K O CTC-.ST cr?rr 
Third Judicial District" 
JUN 2 • ?.0G8 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PCff'-y Clerk" 
TINA ARCHULETA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
R. CHAD HALVERSON MD, et al, 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 070911953 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Date: June 20, 2008 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant Northern Utah Healthcare Corp. dba St. Mark's 
Hospital's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Claim for Negligent Credentialing. Having considered the 
memoranda and arguments raised by the parties at a hearing on June 3, 2008, the Court finds that 
Defendant's Motion must be GRANTED. 
In her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant St. Mark's "failed to seek [sic] 
consult when appropriate, inadequately trained healthcare provider employees, negligently credentialed Drs. 
Simper and Halverson and generally fell below the standard of care with regard to Plaintiff Tina Archuleta." 
Defendant asserts that the ''negligently credentialing" portion of Plaintiff s Complaint should be dismissed. 
At issue before the Court is whether Utah recognizes a cause of action for "negligent credentialing." The 
Court finds that Utah does not. 
Utah Code Annotated §58-13-5(7) clearly insulates a hospital from negligence claims stemming from 
credentialing. Section 58-13-5(7) provides: "any hospital, other health care entity, or professional 
organization conducting or sponsoring the review [is] immune from liability arising from participation in 
a review of a health care provider's . . . "medical competence." The Court holds with Judge Stott in 
Rosenlund v. Mountain View Hospital, Inc. (Ex. A to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss) that Section 58-13-5(7)'s language is "too apparent to be ignored . . . and appears to both 
contemplate and deny the possibility of bringing a negligent credentialing cause of action." 
Additionally, the Court agrees with Defendant and the other district courts who have ruled on this 
issue that Utah Code Annotated § 58-13-4 also grants immunity to health care facilities for claims such as 
this by immunizing them for many categories of decisions and determinations. 
Finally, the Court is further persuaded that negligent credentialing does not exist because of the broad 
immunity granted to health facilities under Utah Code Annotated § 26-25-1. 
The Court finds that Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 211 N.E.2d 253 (111. 
1965) is not persuasive in light of Utah's statutes. "Prior to Darling, a hospital faced negligence liability 
exposure based only on ordinary negligence; the failure to use reasonable care in selection of staff; or on 
a theory of vicarious liability for the conduct of employee or agent medical professionals. . . . Darling,. . 
. recognized a new and independent duty of hospitals to review and supervise the treatment of their patients 
that is administrative or managerial in character." Advincula v. United Blood Sen>s., 176 111. 2d 1, 28 (111. 
1996) (internal citations omitted). It is clear from the Code sections cited above that Utah's legislature did 
not intend to remove the original common law causes of action for negligence against a hospital. Instead, 
it sought to abrogate the extended duty that Darling imposed. Therefore, Darling cannot be considered 
indicative of whether Utah recognizes a cause of action for negligent credentialing. 
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For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED. This Ruling and Order shall 
constitute the final order of the Court. No further order is necessary by the parties. ^ 
DATED thisr&day of June, 2008. 
f Judg^Pat B. Brian District Court Judge 
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